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Abstract
A field study was conducted at time of violent events that 
accompanied demonstrations against the Military Council 
who assumed the power to govern Egypt after 25th January 
Revolution to determine the effects of exposure to political 
news on three dependent variables; public opinion belief 
in conspiracy theory against Egypt, tolerance and affect 
towards the two parties of the violence (rebels and the 
Military Council) through the interim transition of military 
rule. The study found that Egyptian journalism, other 
political factors and demographic variables predicted the 
public's adoption of foreign and domestic conspiracy view 
whether positively or inversely. Unlike newspapers and 
online journalism, TV satellite channels were the only 
source predicting public's tolerance and affect. The study 
also found correlations between respondents' adoption 
of conspiracy theory and their tolerance judgments and 
feelings toward the parties of the conflict. 
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INTRODUCTION
With the assuming of power in Egypt by the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces after President Hosni 
Mubarak was ousted on 11 February 2011 as a result of 
massive demonstrations that lasted 18 days, known as 
25 January Revolution, Egypt has witnessed domestic 
violence and clashes accompanied by either anti-army 
protests or some internal events. Predominantly major 
parties in these violent events were protesters and armed 
forces in time which coincided the idea of conspiracy 
against Egypt and its revolution, whether this plot from 
internal or external hands.
Here I  mention the most important events of 
demonstrations led by the revolutionary powers against 
the Military Council ruling Egypt and its governments 
through the transitional period till conducting the 
questionnaire1.  
On March 5th and 6th, protestors raided the several 
State Security Intelligence (SSI) buildings across Egypt 
claiming that they wanted to secure documents they 
believed to show various crimes committed by the SSI 
against the people during Mubarak’s rule. On April 8th, 
2011, “The Friday of Cleaning”, hundreds of thousands of 
demonstrators filled Al-Tahrir Square in Egypt’s capital 
Cairo and other squares in some Egyptian governorates, 
criticizing the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces for slowdown in the trial of Mubarak and former 
regime leaders and demanded the resignation of remaining 
regime figures and removal of Egypt’s public prosecutor. 
The military forces stormed the field to break up the 
protest and arrested a number of demonstrators who 
decided to stay overnight in Al-Tahrir Square. 
On May 7th, 2011, Salafi Muslims undertook a series 
of attacks against Coptic Christian churches in the 
poor working-class neighborhood of Imbaba in Cairo. 
1 All data to enumerate these events were gathered from some 
Egyptian newspapers: Al-Ahram Newspaper, available at http://
www.gate.ahram.org.eg; Al-Wafd newspaper, available at http://
www.alwafd.org; Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper, available at http://
www.almasryalyoum.com; and Al-Youm Al-Sabea newspaper, 
available at http://www.youm7.com. 
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This event led Christians and Christian revolutionary 
movements to organize a sit-open on the front of Union of 
Egyptian Radio and Television at Maspero area. Christians 
joined the parties and revolutionary powers on 27 May 
in the largest demonstrations since ousting Mubarak’s 
Regime in Al-Tahrir Square and other governorates. 
Protesters called for the “civil state” and demanded no 
military trials for civilians, and the Egyptian Constitution 
to be made before the parliamentary elections. 
July witnessed four demonstrations on 1, 8, 15, and 
23 days organized by hundreds of thousands of protesters 
gathered in Suez and Alexandria governorates and 
Al-Tahrir Square demanding immediate reforms and 
swifter prosecution of former officials from the ousted 
government. On August 1st 2011, Egyptian soldiers 
clashed with protesters, tearing down tents and arrested 
tens of them. 
On 9 October  2011,  thousands of  Chris t ians 
demonstrated in rallies in six Egyptian governorates, 
most of them went to Maspero building and were joined 
by thousands of Muslims to condemn the ongoing 
attacks and demolition of churches. Clashes happened 
between protestors and security forces and led to death 
of at least 25 people besides injuring more than 200. The 
Military Council commented in a press conference that 
the individuals responsible for the protection of Radio 
and Television building were not armed and that a “third 
party” began firing at the armed forces and demonstrators. 
On 19 November the events of “Mohamed Mahmoud 
Street”, one of the surroundings of Al-Tahrir Square, 
witnessed clashes and demonstrations continued until 
Friday following 25 November. and led to the death of 33 
persons at least in addition to 1,700 were injured. After 
these events some demonstrators protested in the front 
of the headquarters of the Egyptian Cabinet against the 
appointment of Kamal Ganzouri as a prime minister. The 
presence of the protesters in front of Egyptian Cabinet for 
many days led to skirmishes broke out in 16 December 
2011 between them and the forces of the buffer zone 
of the army and police. The Egyptian Academy was 
burning because of the throwing of Molotov cocktails. 
The ministry of health announced that the outcome of the 
clashes three deaths and 255 injured.
These bloody events that led to the fall of hundreds 
of victims produced a belief that there is a third party or 
hidden hands as announced by one of the leaders of the 
Military Council, the hands that aimed to prevent the 
cohesion between the army and people and wanted to 
overthrow the state2. The present study tries to monitor 
the effects of exposure to political news covered in 
2 Mohamed Al-Shawadfy (2011, December 20). The Military 
Council: State overthrow scheme includes escalation of events in Al-
Tahrir Square and embarrassing us . Al-Ahram Newspaper. retrieved 
from http://www.gate.ahram.org.eg
various categories of the Egyptian newspapers and TV 
channels beside online journalisim on public’s adoption of 
conspiracy theory against Egypt in the light of all internal 
violent actions caused by demonstrations and sit-ins 
against the ruling Military Council.     
1.  CONSPIRACY THEORY AND MEDIA 
EFFECTS 
A conspiracy theory is a belief system defined as a 
proposed plot by powerful people or organizations 
working together behind the scenes to accomplish some 
usually sinister goal through deception of the public 
(Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; Tuckett, 2004; 
Wood & Douglas, 2013; Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 
2012) in order to withhold the truth about some important 
practice or some terrible event (Sunstein & Vermeule, 
2008) or to purposely harm another group in order to 
maintain their interests (Hall, 2006).  
As some of previous studies (e.g. Chaffee & Kanihan, 
1997; Graber, 2002) revealed that mass media are the 
primary way for people to obtain information about 
politics, beside others (Norris, 2000; Tewksbury, Weaver, 
& Maddex, 2001) concluding different effects of news 
stories on political knowledge. 
Some previous research (e.g. Stempel, Hargrove, 
& Stempel ,  2007;  Gentzkow & Shapiro ,  2004) 
connected conspiracy theories to media effects, or media 
gratifications sought (Al-Kandari, 2010). The present 
study tries, besides the investigating of political news 
effects on the belief of conspiracy theory, to compare 
between the roles of traditional and new media in affecting 
the public’s judgment with respect to this matter. With the 
advent and expansion of Web-based news and its relative 
flexibility, online news sites encourage users to be highly 
selective in their consumption of news content provided 
by editors (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002, p.182), whereas 
in print newspapers it is clear what is the most important 
story so that individuals must actively seek out these 
stories online (Tewksbury & Althaus, 2000). Although 
Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992) found that television 
could be as effective as print media in producing 
knowledge gain, more recent study (Just et al., 1996) 
concluded that television news typically includes less 
coverage and information. Other previous studies (Graber, 
1988; Postman, 1985) found that the characteristics of TV 
enable viewers to understand meanings from both spoken 
words and the images. 
These differences between old and new media lead 
the present study to test the influence of political news 
in various media categories on public’s adoption of 
conspiracy theory. According to some of recent studies 
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004; Sunstein & Vermeule, 2008) 
conspiracy theories are not only domestic phenomenon 
178Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Exposure to Political News Accompanying Violent Demonstrations 
as Reflected in Adopting Conspiracy View Against Egypt
but also can be found all over the world. In my study, 
I classified the conspiracy view against Egypt in two 
categories as disseminated in mainstream media: the first 
category is foreign conspiracy view against Egypt in the 
sense that the troubles and violent events are carried out 
by foreign powers. The second is the domestic conspiracy 
view against Egypt which refers to the internal powers 
behind these events. This study is trying to test the effects 
of exposure to political news in adopting the two kinds of 
conspiracy belief against Egypt. 
2 .   C O N S P I R A C I S M  A N D  T H E 
MANIPULATION WITH TOLERANCE AND 
AFFECT  
Individual conspiracy theories or related counter- 
normative explanations can seem more or less likely 
depending on how they comport with other beliefs held 
by the audience (Wood & Douglas, 2013, p.1). Some of 
previous studies, although seem to be a starting point to 
test these relationships, were limited to the finding that 
beliefs in un related conspiracy theories tend to inter- 
correlate (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; 
Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Wood 
et al., 2012); the believes in conspiracy theories would 
be correlated to how much individuals see authorities 
as fundamentally deceptive (Simon, Snow, & Read, 
2004); how much time the conspiracists spend against 
official explanation (Simmons & Parsons, 2005; Wood & 
Douglas, 2013) and positively correlated with mistrust of 
other people (Goertzel, 1994).
This discussion is voluminous and highly visible in 
concluding to what extent conspiracists adopt political 
tolerance towards the parties in conflict actions. Political 
tolerance was historically defined as a willingness to 
permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes” 
(Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1982, p.2); willingness 
to extend the rights of citizenship to all members of the 
polity—that is to allow political freedoms to those who are 
different” (Gibson & Bingham, 1982, p.604); extending 
civil liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly 
to hate groups and other politically unpopular minorities 
(Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997, p.569) and is defined 
as opposition to state actions that limit opportunities for 
citizens, individually or in groups, to compete for political 
power (Mccabe, 2010, p.12). Tolerance actually develops 
as a result of one’s exposure to differing viewpoints which 
leads to different perspectives and allows opposition in 
a slow process of becoming challenged in one’s ideas 
(Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004; Mccabe, 2010; 
Mutz, 2002). Although there are many studies on political 
tolerance, a few of them (Boyle et al. 2006; Keum et al. 
2005; Nelson et al. 1997) researched its relationships 
to media effects and examined the way in which media 
framing of civil liberties affected levels of tolerance; 
also, Mccabe (2010) examined the relationship between 
selectivity of media content, particularly that of online 
news, and feelings of political tolerance.
Thus the present study not only tests the influence 
of the exposure to political news on Egyptian public 
opinion’s tolerance and feeling towards the parties of 
violent events (Military Council and the demonstrators) 
accompanied the demonstrations, but also extends 
to explore the relationships between the individual 
conspiracy views and the degrees of both tolerance and 
feelings. Although some of previous studies defined 
political tolerance as allowing  political freedoms to those 
who are different (Gibson & Bingham, 1982, p.604) or as 
the belief that all citizens have the right to express their 
political views, regardless of how dangerous or repugnant 
those views (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996, p.29) my 
study is investigating the extent to what respondents are 
feeling and believing in the right of Egyptian rebels to 
demonstrate specially when terrible events or violence 
come from their actions which raised the notion of 
conspiracy against the country, on the other hand, what 
will happen in their feeling and thought towards the 
authority (Military Council) regarding the degrees of 
adopting the conspiracy view.  
3.  HYPOTHESES 
H1: Exposure to political news will significantly predict 
the adoption of both foreign and domestic conspiracy 
view against Egypt.
H2: Exposure to political news will significantly 
predict tolerance toward both rebels and Military Council.
H3: Exposure to political news will significantly 
predict affect toward both rebels and Military Council.
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 tested three levels of predictors. 
The first one was the exposure to news in the main kinds 
of old and new media (newspapers, TV channels and 
Internet). The second level included political predictors 
(talking with other about the issue, political involvement, 
external and internal political efficacy, political 
participation and political affiliation) and the third 
level was some of demographic variables (age, gender, 
education and income). A linear regression analysis was 
conducted by using “Enter Model” with conspiracy views, 
tolerance, and affect indexes as the dependent variables. 
H4: The adoption of conspiracy view against Egypt will 
be positively associated with both of tolerance, and affect 
toward the Military Council and negatively with the rebels. 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to test the 
fourth hypothesis to determine the relationships between 
variables on this hypothesis, the idea that has not been 
explicitly tested within these relationships in previous 
studies. I expected respondents with high levels of 
adopting conspiracy views against Egypt would be more 
tolerant and sympathetic to the ruling Military Council and 
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less to the rebels. Contrary to this were the relationships of 
respondents embracing conspiracy view in low.
4 .   R E S E A R C H  D E S I G N  A N D 
METHODOLOGY
To test the hypotheses I conducted a survey analysis using 
data collected over the population of Cairo and Damietta 
governorates in Egypt (N = 340) in January 2012. This 
date came two weeks after one of the violent events when 
the sit-in at the cabinet building was dispersed at dawn on 
December 16th and continued for a week. The questionnaire 
items included 18 independent variables classified in three 
levels to test their prediction of the three dependent variables 
of the study (conspiracy view against Egypt, tolerance, and 
feelings towards the two parties of the conflict).  
4.1  Dependent variables
There are three main dependent variables included in the 
questionnaire as following (See Appendix):
Conspiracy views: The questionnaire included a 
general inquiry about the reasons behind the violence 
occurred between the rebels and the security forces 
(whether police or army). Two answers were given to 
measure how much respondents are adopting foreign 
conspiracy view against Egypt (M = 4.35, SD = 1.02). 
Three answers were given to measure how much 
respondents are adopting domestic conspiracy view (M = 
4.29, SD = 0.88). 
Tolerance: The questionnaire included the tolerance 
for the two sides of the violent events which erupted 
through the demonstrations against the ruling military 
authority. The respondents answered seven items to 
measure how much they were adopting tolerance for the 
tolerance for the Military Council (M = 2.73, SD = 0.96). 
The respondents also answered six items to measure 
how much they were adopting The tolerance for the 
demonstrators (M = 2.70, SD =0 .89). 
Affect: Respondents were asked two questions about 
how much they feel toward each of the two parties of the 
conflict (The Military Council and the demonstrators). 
The feeling thermometer was evolved from the study 
of Nelson et al. (1997), the feeling toward The Military 
Council (M = 5.02, SD = 2.35) and the tolerance toward 
the demonstrators (M = 6.15, SD = 2.18). 
4.2  Independent Variables
The questionnaire contained the three levels of predictors 
as shown in the following (See Appendix):  
Exposure to political news: In order to analyze the 
impact of exposure to violent events accompanying the 
demonstrations against the military rule, exposure to the 
major old and new media (newspapers, television, and the 
Internet) was categorized according to the degree of using 
its political news. Respondents were asked questions 
about the exposure’s degree of political news and political 
contents during the last month in national (State owned) 
newspapers (M = 1.17, SD = 1.04), party newspapers 
(M = 0.59, SD = 0.87), private newspapers (M = .99, 
SD = 1.09), Egyptian State (official) TV channels (M = 
2.05, SD = 1.17), private TV channels (M = 1.86, SD = 
1.10), Egyptian web news (M = 1.12, SD = 1.21), Arab 
and foreign web news (M = 0.81, SD = .997), and social 
network websites (M = 1.54, SD = 1.37).
Talking with others about the issue: Respondents were 
asked four questions about if they were talking about 
violent events accompanying the demonstrations against 
The Military Council and security forces with any of  their 
families, friends, colleagues and other people they might 
meet in public places (M = 3.08, SD = 0.58). 
Political involvement: Political involvement has been 
frequently defined as a stable psychological trait that 
reveals the perceived relevance of public affairs issues in 
the political communication literature (Pinkleton, 1999). 
Political involvement is important to political decision 
making because it activates individuals’ purposeful 
information search and then involved individuals are 
active information seekers (Pinkleton & Austin, 2001, 
2004). Kushin and Yamamoto (2010, p.610) has shown 
that the more an issue is perceived relevant and interesting, 
the greater the need for information, which increases 
information oriented media use. As individuals are integrated 
into politics, they develop more active information seeking 
habits and become less likely to distance themselves from 
political information (Fu, Mou, Miller, & Jalette, 2011, p.49) 
to help them in political decision making such as voting and 
evaluating events and politicians. 
The political involvement scale has been used quite 
extensively in previous research (e.g. Fu et al., 2011; 
Pinkleton & Austin, 2001). Respondents were asked to 
answer the extent to which they paid attention and were 
involved in political events of the following six questions 
(M = 3.41, SD = 0.48). 
Political efficacy: The concept of political efficacy 
was introduced to political science by Angus Campbell 
and his colleagues from the Survey Research Centre, 
University of Michigan in their first U.S. national election 
survey in 1952 election study, The Voter Decides (quoted 
in Kenski & Stroud, 2006, P.174). They saw that political 
efficacy refers to a citizen’s belief in one’s own capacities 
to take part in and affect the political system or society. 
Subsequent several scholars have noted that political 
efficacy has two different dimensions: 1) Internal efficacy 
(the personal sense of efficacy) in which a person’s 
perceptions about the impact he or she may have on the 
political process come as a result of one’s own skills and 
confidence. 2) External efficacy is a more system-oriented 
sense of efficacy which refers to a person’s perceptions of 
political institutions’ responsiveness to citizens’ actions in 
the political process (Coleman, Morrison, & Svennevig, 
2008; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 
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1991; Schulz, 2005). Many previous studies (e.g. Austin, 
Van de Vord, Pinkleton, & Epstein, 2008; Cornfield, 2003; 
Delli Carpini & Keeter, 2003; Jennings & Zeitner, 2003; 
Lin & Lim, 2002; Norris, 2001) examined political efficacy 
and its relationships to access to the Internet, or news 
consumption (e.g. Aarts & Semetko, 2003). Here I try to 
discover a new area of the relationships between political 
efficacy and the public adoption of conspiracy theory.
The questionnaire included two items to measure 
the internal political efficacy dimension evolved from 
previous studies (Schulz, 2005; Tewksbury, Hals, & 
Bibart, 2008) (M = 3.14, SD = 1.09), and two items to 
measure the external political efficacy dimension evolved 
from the studies of Cantijoch, Jorba, San Martin (2008), 
and Schulz (2005) (M = 1.87, SD =0.88). 
Political participation: was defined as “activity that 
has the intent or effect of influencing government action– 
either directly by affecting the making of implementation 
of public policy or indirectly by influencing the people’s 
selection of those policies” (Schulz, 2005; Verba, 
Schlotzman, & Brady, 1995). The questionnaire included 
eight activities’ questions which respondents answered if 
they did the last few months (M = 0.68, SD = 0.21).
Although some of previous studies (e.g. Moy, Torres, 
Tanaka, & McCluskey, 2005; Scheufele, 2002) had linked 
between political participation as dependent variable 
predicted by traditional media use, and internet use (e.g. 
Austin et al, 2008; Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Nisbet 
& Scheufele, 2004) there is no evidence about political 
participation as an independent variable to alternatively 
predict  media effects.
Demographic Items: The study included a variety of 
demographic factors; age (M = 2.27, SD = 0.95), sex (M 
= .45, SD = 0.498), education (M = 2.003, SD = 0.75), 
income (M = 3.17, SD = 1.58) and political affiliation (M 
= 0.54, SD = 0.499).
5.  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Findings in Table 1 show a partial support to the first 
hypothesis that there was a logistic regression of how 
some of the three levels predicted the belief in both 
foreign and domestic conspiracy against Egypt. Reading 
political news in Egyptian party-owned newspapers, 
exposure to politics in Egypstian State TV channels, 
and political affiliation were positive coefficients which 
predicted the adoption of foreign conspiracy view against 
Egypt while internal political efficacy was negative 
significant predictor to this index. Reading political news 
in private newspapers, access to social network websites, 
internal political efficacy and education were negative 
coefficients which predicted the domestic conspiracy view 
while political affiliation was a positive predictor.
The findings for the first level of analysis illuminate 
that the more exposure to political news (in Egyptian 
party-owned newspapers and official TV channels) at time 
of violent events that accompanied demonstrations against 
the Military Council led to more adoption of foreign 
conspiracy view against Egypt, and the higher exposure 
to political news in both private newspapers and social 
network websites led to less domestic conspiracy view. 
These findings show that the political content in 
traditional and online journalism was able to raise the 
notion of foreign conspiracy against Egypt for respondents 
and then reduce the domestic conspiracy view of them. 
Some of previous research (Schleifer, 2005; Vaughan, 
2002) probably explain these outcomes by revealing 
that millions of Arabs strongly believe that America, 
West and Zionists purposely and continuously scheme 
to exploit their wealth and conspire to prevent any Arab 
progress or unity and this conspiracy notion had raised 
after September 11th attacks under the pretext “War on 
Terror” (e.g. Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2004; Tuckett, 2004) 
to enable USA and its allies more intervention in the 
Middle East and Arab affairs. Much of the Arab media 
reinforce the idea that America supports Israel to engage 
Arabs in crises, that it schemes to weaken Arab countries 
by wars to prevent their progress (AL-Kandari, 2010) or 
the “War on Terror” was in reality a war on Islam (Bunt, 
2003; Kellner, 2004; Lantos, 2002). Contrary to these 
previous studies, AL-Kandari (2010, p.71) concluded 
that Arab news networks are not the cause of conspiracy 
theories about America and they might have the opposite 
effect, because they are leading American officials to 
talk directly to the Arab masses and to present America 
as the home of democracy, freedom and human rights 
that Arab authorities need to follow as a role model in 
politics. The findings of present study come in contrary 
to AL-Kandari’s study because she applied her research 
in different time and circumstances are not experiencing 
local tensions and violent actions, and also she employed 
the gratification approach to examine the influence of 
one category of mass media (Arab news networks) on the 
belief in conspiracy theories about America. 
The internal political efficacy at the second level of 
predictors negatively influences public’s adoption of both 
foreign and domestic conspiracy theory against Egypt, 
and the education at the third level predicted negatively 
the external conspiracy notion. These results illustrate 
that respondents with higher confidence in their own 
political capacities, and those who were more educated 
had adopted a less conspiracy view against Egypt. Oliver 
and Wood (2012, p.11) illuminated that if a conspiracist 
predisposition is magnified by a lack of information or 
feelings of uncertainty, then “conspiracism” should be 
more common among the less educated and  the less 
politically informed. Thus, respondents in my study who 
had limited views and perceptions according to their 
limited skills and confidence made conclusions on violent 
events that they did not have a clear understanding about.  
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Table 1
OLS Regression of  Conspiracy View  on Selected 
Predictors
Predictors
Adoption of foreign 
conspiracy theory
Adoption 
of domestic 
conspiracy theory
B SE B SE
Reading news in  
national newspapers -1.63* .058 3.218 .050
Reading news in party 
newspapers .133* .068 1.665 .058
Reading news in private 
newspapers -4.07 .056 -.113* .048
Viewing news in 
Egyptian State channels .165*** .050 5.295 .043
Viewing news in private 
channels 1.582 .053 3.387   .046
Access to Egyptian web 
news 1.743 .063 -6.006  .054
Access to Arab and 
foreign web news 2.048 .071 7.749 .061
Access to social network 
websites -.104 .057 -9.374*  .049
Talking with others 
about the issue 9.179 .102 1.518 .087
Political involvement 1.456 .132 .186 .113
External political 
efficacy 3.843 .063 -5.448   .054
Internal political efficacy -.145**  .053 -9.550* .045
Political participation .503 .293 .323 .252
Political affiliation 
(Islamic) .316** .111 .324***  .095
Age -2.685 .067 -5.873   .058
Gender (male) 3.252 .118 8.482 .102
Education -9.058 .075 -.128*   .065
Income 2.485 .037 1.799 .031
R2 .155 .176
Adjusted R2 .107 .130
F change 3.261 3.821
Sig. F change .000 .000
Note. B is unstandardized regression coefficients , SE is standard 
errors.
*p  ≤ .06.  ** p  ≤ .01.  *** p  ≤.001.  N = 340
Also at the second level I found that Islamic political 
affiliation positively predicted the adoption of both foreign 
and domestic conspiracy view against Egypt. The view 
of Oliver and Wood (2012) supports my outcome by 
revealing that individual-level partisanship and ideology 
play role in identifying conspiracy theory. In Egypt the 
Islamic parties gained around 75% of the total seats in the 
parliamentary elections held in the period from November 
28th, 2011-January 10th, 20123. That means respondents 
who said they voted for Islamic parties, whether favor 
them or are members at these parties; represent the higher 
ratio of those who adopted the foreign and domestic 
conspiracy theory against Egypt. 
Table 2 reveals a partial support to the second 
hypothesis that some elements of the three levels 
predicted the respondents’ tolerance toward the rebels 
and the Military Council. At the first level of predictors, 
viewing political news in Egyptian State TV channels 
was a positive significant predictor of adopting tolerance 
toward the Military Council and a negative significant 
predictor of adopting tolerance toward the rebels, while 
viewing private TV channels was a negative predictor of 
adopting tolerance toward the Military Council. These 
contradictory relationships may be due to the fact that 
the authority is controlling the State channels which are 
expected to refrain from crossing the red line and remain 
within the policies of governing authority; in contrast, 
the private channels tend to function under an anti-
government slant, utilizing the freedom that has been more 
available after 25 January Revolution. In this hypothesis 
exposure to political news in both Egyptian State and 
private channels was far superior to reading political news 
in the three categories of Egyptian newspapers, and this 
finding is consistent with what previous studies attributed 
to the mediated and visual appeal of television (Walma 
van der Molen & Van der Voort, 2000) and its strong 
impact on the viewers’ construction of meaning, and that 
news workers are drawn to stories which offer powerful 
images (Cooper, 2000). In addition, newspaper use tends 
to be significantly less selective than television news use 
(Mccabe, 2010) which leads individuals to be more likely 
to expose themselves to information that matches personal 
interest (Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002) and the retention of 
these information may be stronger from television due to 
individual interest in certain topics (Neuman et al. 1992).
I did not find online news or social web site variables 
to predict tolerance. Mccabe (2010) illuminated that online 
news media allows individuals to be highly selective 
of news content (p.70), and selective exposure only to 
familiar content can mitigate the potential diversity of ideas 
and thus limit influences on tolerance (p.3). On the other 
hand, the theory of affective intelligence argues that when 
people have a predisposition, they will rely on it when 
making a judgment and will be less likely to accept new 
information than people who do not hold a predisposition. 
(Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Stevens, 2005, p.951). 
3 Freedom and Justice Party belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood 
won the proportion of 46.2% of the total seats in the Egyptian 
parliament, also the Islamic Salafi Al-Nour Party scooped proportion 
of 25.1% in addition to the rest of some parties with Islamic 
background as Al-Wasat Al-Gadid (New Centrist) 2.2%, Al-Asalah 
(Originality) Party, construction and Development Party 2.2%.
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That is why the high access to online news had no effects 
on respondents’ political tolerance judgments.
Table 2
OLS Regression of  Tolerance on Selected Predictors 
Predictors
Tolerance toward the 
military council
Tolerance toward the 
rebels
B SE B SE
Reading news in  
national newspapers 6.117 .051 -2.645 .049
Reading news in party 
newspapers -1.166 .059 -3.392 .057
Reading news in 
private newspapers -1.589 .049 4.433 .047
Viewing news in 
Egyptian State 
channels 
.231*** .044 -.242*** .042
Viewing news in 
private channels -.148** .047 7.769 .045
Access to Egyptian 
web news -4.351 .055 5.818 .053
Access to Arab and 
foreign web news 7.048 .062 -1.666 .060
Access to social 
network websites 2.991 .050 -5.937 .048
Talking with others 
about the issue 5.115 .089 -6.746 .086
Political involvement -3.144 .115 -4.041 .111
External political 
efficacy .111* .055 -4.865 .053
Internal political 
efficacy -6.645 .046 8.614* .044
Political participation 1.269*** .256 -1.103*** .246
Political affiliation 
(Islamic) .300** .097 -.188* .093
Age .189** .059 -2.030 .056
Gender (male) -.101 .103 4.620 .099
Education 4.103 .066 4.374 .063
Income -1.542 .032 -5.895* .031
R2 .277 .231
Adjusted R2 .237 .188
F change 6.848 5.35
Sig. F change .000 .000
Note. B is unstandardized regression coefficients, SE is standard 
errors. 
*p  ≤ .06.  ** p  ≤ .01.  *** p  ≤.001.  N = 340
At the second level of predictors, the external political 
efficacy positively predicted respondents’ tolerance 
toward the Military Council while internal efficacy 
positively predicted the tolerance toward the rebels 
(Table 2). These outcomes mean that respondents with 
a higher image and experience of the responsiveness of 
political system, institutions and actors were more tolerant 
toward the Military Council, whereas respondents with 
a higher confidence of their own political capacity and 
to act politically were more tolerant toward the rebels. 
Some of previous studies (Sotelo, 2000; Sullivan et al. 
1993) support my findings illuminating that individuals 
who have political experience and know more about the 
political systems, government, and other political and civic 
information are increasingly more tolerant specially toward 
the authority, and that their trust in government is positively 
correlated with external efficacy (Niemi et. al., 1991). Yet 
Sunstein and Vermeule (2008, p.29) see that for people who 
lack direct or personal information about the explanations 
for terrible events, they are often tempted to attribute such 
events to some nefarious actor. Accordingly, they become 
less tolerant toward heinous or disliked people. 
Also at the second level, political participation 
significantly predicted tolerance positively toward the 
Military Council and negatively toward the rebels. 
The positive relationship is consistent with parallel 
relation between external efficacy and tolerance for the 
Military Council as shown above, because researchers 
demonstrated that external efficacy is more likely to be 
influenced by experiences with political participation than 
internal efficacy and support the view that confidence in 
system responsiveness is less stable than confidence in 
one’s own ability to act politically (Schulz, 2005, p.3). 
Once he feels that he can bring about political change, 
individually or in concert with others, the person will be 
more likely to actively involve in politics (Coleman et al. 
2008, p.772). 
The Islamic political affiliation predicted tolerance 
positively toward the Military Council and negatively 
toward the rebels. This finding matches with the above 
relationship between political participation and tolerance 
and reveals that respondents who support Islamic 
parties may be more politically participated and adopt 
more tolerance toward the ruling Military Council and 
less tolerant to particular groups who were involved in 
violence as a result of their escalating activities against the 
authority. The intolerance of public with Islamic political 
affiliation toward the rebels probably comes from the fact 
that the majority of sit-ins and protests accompanied by 
riots and violence were at the hands of the revolutionary 
forces of liberalism and Christians-as I pointed out in the 
introduction, and did not include groups or parties with 
an Islamic background which focused attention not to 
collision the Military Council in order to achieve political 
gains such as the parliamentary majority and wining the 
presidential election. Moreover Egyptian people had been 
looking forward to more stability through the transitional 
phase of ruling Military Council, therefore any groups 
destabilizing will be undesirable and viewed as against 
public order. Although findings of some previous studies 
(e.g. Reimer & Park, 2001; Sullivan et al. 1982) are 
reflecting this relationship concluding that religion plays 
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Golebiowska (1999) found that although gender 
differences in tolerance have not been large but have been 
persisting since the beginning of systematic research on 
the subject in 1950s, women are more reluctant than men 
to allow unpopular groups to exercise their constitutional 
rights, while Sullivan et al. (1982) found that women and 
men select different disliked groups, noting that women 
tend to pick nonreligious groups as their least-liked. 
However, no differences between men and women were 
reported (Sullivan, et al., 1982). No gender differences 
were found in the present study contrary to the findings 
of Golebiowska in which she measured tolerance 
toward the disliked social groups such as atheist, racists, 
homosexuality or militarists and their acceptance socially. 
Table 3
OLS Regression of  Affect on Selected Predictors
Predictors
Feelings toward the 
Military Council
Feelings toward the 
rebels
B SE B SE
Reading news in  
national newspapers .106 .128 8.526 .126
Reading news in 
party newspapers .156 .150 8.702 .148
Reading news in 
private newspapers -.174 .124  .157 .122
Viewing news in 
Egyptian State 
channels 
.520*** .111  -.270*   .109  
Viewing news in 
private channels -.257* .118  9.324   .116   
Access to Egyptian 
web news -8.018 .139 -1.808   .137
Access to Arab and 
foreign web news .147 .158 4.839 .155
Access to social 
network websites -9.795 .126 -7.386 .124    
Talking with others 
about the issue .278 .225 .194    .222    
Political 
involvement 5.293   .292 .240 .287    
External political 
efficacy .232 .138 -.328* .136
Internal political 
efficacy -.363* .117 .113 .115
Political 
participation 2.198** .648   -2.201*** .636   
Political affiliation 
(Islamic) .476* .245  .177 .241
Age 382** .148  -.237 .146
a factor in influencing tolerance these studies meant to 
examine “religiosity” which was gauged by a variety of 
measurements, including belonging, behavior and belief 
(Kellstedt & Corwin, 1993). In my study the effects on 
tolerance were associated not with the public as adopters 
of Islamic religion but with public who affiliated or 
preferred political parties and groups politicizing Islam. 
Although the study by Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, 
Hermsen, and Russin (2000) indicated that tolerance is 
most likely cultivated when information is obtained from 
widely varied networks consisting of mostly tolerant 
people, I did not find talking with others about the issue 
to significantly predict tolerance. The reason is that my 
study focused on social contact for discussion about 
demonstrations and violent actions and not on general 
sources of social interaction, that tolerance is more likely 
to flow from extensive contact with a large and diverse 
number of people, including both acquaintance and close 
personal ties (Cigler & Joslyn, 2002; Dovidio, Gaertner, 
& Kawakami, 2003; Harrell, 2010; Hello, Scheepers, 
Vermulst, & Gerris, 2004). 
At the third level I found two demographic variables 
which influenced political tolerance, first, age positively 
predicted respondents’ tolerance toward the Military 
Council. Contrary to this finding, previous research (e.g. 
Bobo & Licari, 1989; Owen & Dennis, 1987; Sullivan et 
al., 1982) found negative relationships between age and 
tolerance because these studies linked age to education 
in social contexts that considered adolescents or high 
school students as more educated than their parents 
(Owen & Dennis, 1987). Second, the income level 
negatively predicted tolerance toward the rebels. Peffley 
& Rohrschneider (2003) found that political tolerance 
is greater in stable democracies that have endured over 
time (the longer the better), independent of a nation’s 
socioeconomic development. In my study this negative 
relationship is probably due to people with the high 
income are characterized with more stability in social and 
economic welfare which is threatened by demonstrations, 
sit-ins and protests caused by the rebels (who became a 
disliked group) in this period which witnessed a decline in 
economic performance in the country. 
I did not find significant relationships between the 
two kinds of tolerance and both of gender and education. 
Sullivan et al. (1982) argue that education is less 
important than previously reported in other studies, while 
recently, Gaasholt and Togeby (1995) demonstrated that 
cognitive constraint is high also in the minority among 
people lacking in academic education that scores high on 
tolerance. On the contrary, Bobo and Licari (1989) found 
strong positive effects of education on a multiple target 
group tolerance scale. The present study is different in its 
findings from previous studies because they linked the 
influence of education with other variables such as social 
class, ethnic and religious groups or political affiliation. 
To be continued
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Predictors
Feelings toward the 
Military Council
Feelings toward the 
rebels
B SE B SE
Gender (male) -.221 .261  .119 .258
Education 4.007 .166 -8.598 .164
Income -1.858 .081 -7.202 .079 
R2 .229 .133
Adjusted R2 .186 .085
F change 5.31 2.744
Sig. F change .000 .000
Note. B is unstandardized regression coefficients, SE is standard 
errors (SE).
*p  ≤ .06.  ** p  ≤ .01.  *** p  ≤.001
I found partial support to the third hypothesis related 
to the three levels of predictors on respondents feelings 
toward the two parties of the violent actions (Table 3). 
For the first level, viewing political news in Egyptian 
State TV channels was a positive significant predictor of 
respondents feeling toward the Military Council and a 
negative significant predictor of their feeling toward the 
rebels, while viewing private TV channels was a negative 
predictor of feelings toward the Military Council. These 
relationships are largely In line with what has been 
reached in the second hypothesis related to the effects 
of these indicators at the first level, that positive effect 
of viewing political news in Egyptian TV channels on 
tolerance toward the authority led to positive feelings to 
it, and its negative effect on tolerance toward the rebels 
created negative feelings to them, also the negative effect 
of viewing political news in private TV channels on 
tolerance toward the authority created negative feelings 
to it. The “hot cognition” assumption which had been 
reached by previous research (e.g. Lodge & Taber, 2000, 
2005; Lodge, Steenbergen, & Brau, 1995) clears my 
findings that all sociopolitical concepts that have been 
evaluated in the past are affectively charged, and this 
affect will bring automaticity toward political leaders, 
groups, and issues.  
At the second level, although the second hypothesis 
showed significant positive effects of external political 
efficacy on tolerance toward the Military Council and no 
significant effects were obvious on tolerance toward the 
rebels (review Table 2); the external efficacy significantly 
predicted negative feeling toward the rebels as shown in 
Table 3.
Also in spite that the second hypothesis illuminated 
significant positive effects of internal political efficacy on 
tolerance toward the rebels and no significant effects were 
Continued found on tolerance toward the Military Council (Table 2), 
the internal efficacy negatively predicted feeling toward 
the Military Council (Table 3). These findings reveal 
that the positive feeling toward one of the parties of the 
conflict leads to a lack of tolerance toward the other 
party, and vice versa. Lodge and Taber (2005) explicate 
this phenomena through the process of “evaluative 
integration” in which citizens may store and rely on more 
and different types of considerations when evaluating 
groups or issues. If so, they cannot depend on a simple 
affective linkage in memory, but will sample a fuller set 
of considerations that have been stored in memory about 
the object and then and there construct an evaluation 
from an integration of these considerations. (p.457) Then 
the positive or negative feelings toward the groups or 
politicians not necessarily bring all positive or negative 
evaluations of them; in addition, the positive evaluation 
of one party may negatively affect emotions toward 
counterparts in the conflict process.
The political activity significantly predicted feeling 
positively toward the Council and negatively toward 
the rebels; also Islamic political affiliation significantly 
predicted positive feeling toward the Council. These 
findings in hypothesis 3 also match to a large extent with 
findings in the second hypothesis with respect to those 
variables. At the third level, age was the only positive 
significant predictor of feeling toward the Military 
Council and also comes consistent with its effects on 
tolerance toward the authority.
In the first three hypotheses there were no effects of 
both of talking with others about the issue, and political 
involvement. Scheufele (2002) suggested that citizens’ 
understanding of politics may depend on an interactive 
effect of mass and interpersonal communication. That is, 
people who engage in interpersonal discussion with others 
about what they have read or heard in mass media will 
have disproportionately higher levels of understanding 
than people who engage in political discussions with 
others less frequently (p.49). Then people with less 
discussions about the issue will be vulnerable to the 
content of the mass media more than those who do not 
rely on the extensive use of them. On the other hand, 
people with a higher level of political involvement 
have a greater need for information about issue which 
is perceived relevant and interesting (Chew, 1994; 
Kushin & Yamamoto, 2010) and they will gain more 
knowledge about the issue and become aware of it more 
than uninvolved people who will be more influenced by 
various information sources. 
Table 4 shows strong support to the fourth hypothesis 
that both of foreign and domestic conspiracy view against 
Egypt was significantly associated positively with tolerance 
toward the Military Council and negatively with the rebels.
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Table 4
Correlations Between Conspiracy and Both of 
Tolerance and Affect
Variables Foreign conspiracy view
Domestic conspiracy 
view
Tolerance toward the 
Military Council .33** .13*
Tolerance toward the 
rebels -.39** -.17**
Feelings toward the 
Military Council .34** .11*
Feelings toward the 
rebels -.24** -.029
Note. Sig. (2-tailed) * p  ≤ .06.  ** p  ≤ .01. N= 340
This raising thought of conspiratorial thinking, 
specifically in time of local violent events caused by the 
rebels, led the public to adopt more negative feelings and 
less tolerant attitude toward them and to develop positive 
feelings and more tolerance toward the authority. The 
violent actions and clashes with security forces which 
accompanied rebels’ demonstrations and sit-ins in the 
present study may cause “anxiety” discussed by Marcus 
et al. (2005) through the theory of “affective intelligence” 
revealing that this anxiety caused by the actions of the 
disliked group decreases tolerance toward them (p.953). 
On the other hand the “motivated reasoning approach” 
interprets my findings that all notions and beliefs whether 
positive or negative toward the politicians or social groups 
have its affect-laden or so called “hot cognition” and this 
affective charge becomes directly linked to the concepts 
in long-term memory through on–line (OL) tally (Fazio, 
2001; Lodge & Taber, 2000, 2005). The respondents’ 
intolerance toward the rebels was due to their negative 
evaluations and beliefs that had been charged with 
negative emotions, the same that applied to the linkage 
between positive evaluations and affective charge toward 
the Military Council resulting in more tolerance. 
CONCLUSION  
My findings regarding exposure to political news 
accompanying violent demonstrations suggest the ability 
of exposure to political news to affect public’s adoption 
of conspiracy view against Egypt. Reading political news 
in Egyptian party newspapers and viewing politics in 
state TV channels affected the public to embrace more 
of foreign conspiracy view against Egypt, while reading 
political news in Egyptian private newspapers and access 
to social network websites affected the public to adopt 
less of domestic conspiracy view even in the case of the 
outbreak of internal disturbances and violence caused by 
internal groups, political activists and demonstrators in 
the wake of January 25th revolution in 2011. The public 
with higher internal political efficacy and education were 
less in their adopting of foreign and domestic conspiracy 
view against Egypt, while the public with higher Islamic 
political affiliation have been more in adopting both kinds 
of conspiracy view.  
I found that the state and private satellite channels 
have had the sole effect without all of newspapers and 
online journalism to affect public’s tolerance and affect. 
These findings reveal the success of official visual 
media to influence the public judgments and feelings 
toward the authority positively and, in contrast, were 
the private channels that do not fall under the ruling 
power. The outcomes of the present study demonstrate 
that both external and internal political efficacy, political 
participation, Islamic political affiliation, age and income 
status are equal in their significant effects positively on 
public’s tolerance and feelings toward the authority and 
negatively toward other social groups in violent actions. 
These findings mean that the public in Egypt is less 
tolerant and sympathetic toward activists and political 
groups who cause terrible or violent actions even if 
related to their right for speech or legitimate demands in 
a difficult period which witnessed instability in economic 
and domestic security. 
The present study suggests the linkage between 
tolerance attitude and feelings toward the two parties of 
the violent actions goes through the process of “evaluative 
integration” which led to the evaluation of one of the 
parties adversely consisting of emotion to the other party 
in the conflict process, or the higher level of tolerance 
toward one party would be associated to more positive 
feelings to it, while intolerance would be associated 
to more negative feelings toward the same party. This 
“directional goals” process (Lodge & Taber, 2005; Morris, 
Squires, Taber, & Lodge, 2003) which is used by the 
respondents in my study construes that they were bias 
when calling assessments and tolerant attitudes from the 
long-term memory and automatically these directional 
goals fetch all emotional and semantic content related 
to these assessments. My findings also suggest that the 
respondents not only directed their tolerant attitudes 
and emotions toward the two parties of the conflict, but 
also had the priority to link their negative feelings and 
intolerance toward the rebels to the adoption of conspiracy 
view against Egypt and to link their positive feelings and 
more tolerance toward the Military Council.
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APPENDIX
Variables Items Scales
Reading political 
news and contents 
in newspapers 
(national, party 
and private 
newspapers) 
1- During the last month were you reading the politics in 
newspapers or magazines?
2- How many times per the week were you reading domestic 
political news and other political contents in every one of 
the three categories of Egyptian journals (national, party, and 
private newspapers)? (respondents answered for each one of 
newspapers and magazines’ categories).
3- How many hours per each time were you reading political 
news and other political contents? 
(respondents answered for each one of newspapers and 
magazines’ categories).
* The total of three questions’ answers were computed to 
calculate arithmetic mean of this variable, that reading's degree 
of political contents in each kind of Egyptian newspapers 
(national, party, and private) were computed in four degrees. 
1- 0 = Never; 1 = Few; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = 
always
2- 0 = Never; 1 = less than one day a week; 2 = 1-2 
days a week; 3 = 3-5 days a week; 4 = every day
3- 0 = never; 1 = less than ½ hour; 2 = ½ - 1 
hour; 3 = 1-2 hours;  4= more than 2 hours
* 0 = Non; 1 = Low; 2 = Medium; 3 = High  
Exposure to 
political news and 
programs in TV 
(official Egyptian 
and  private 
channels)
1- During the last month were you viewing the politics in TV 
channels (one question for Egyptian State TV Channels and 
other for private)?
2- How many times per the week were you viewing domestic 
political news and other political programs in every one of the 
two categories of TV channels (Egyptian State, and private 
channels)? (respondents answered for each one of channels).
3- How many hours per each time were you viewing political 
news and programs? 
(respondents answered for each one of channels’ categories).
* The total of three questions’ answers were computed to 
calculate arithmetic mean of this variable, that exposure's degree 
of news and political contents in each kind of Egyptian State 
and private TV channels were computed in four degrees.
1- 0 = Never; 1 = Few; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = 
always
2- 0 = Never; 1 = less than one day a week; 2 = 1-2 
days a week; 3 = 3-5 days a week; 4 = every day
3- 0 = never; 1 = less than ½ hour; 2 = ½ - 1 
hour; 3 = 1-2 hours; 4 = more than 2 hours
* 0 = Non; 1 = Low; 2 = Medium; 3 = High  
Access to political 
news in the web
1- During the last month were you accessing the online news, 
blogs, or social network websites ?
2- How many times per the week were you accessing domestic 
political news and other political contents in every one of the 
categories of the web (Egyptian web, Arab web, social network 
websites)? (respondents answered for each one of the web sites).
3- How many hours per each time were you accessing political 
news and political contents? (respondents answered for each one 
of the web’s categories).
* The total of three questions’ answers were computed to 
calculate arithmetic mean of this variable, that the degree of 
access to news and political contents in each kind of the web 
(Egyptian web, Arab web, and social networks websites) were 
computed in four degrees. 
1- 0 = Never; 1 = Few; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = 
always
2- 0 = Never; 1= less than one day a week; 2 = 1-2 
days a week; 3 = 3-5 days a week; 4 = every day
3- 0 = never; 1 = less than ½ hour; 2 = ½ - 1 
hour; 3 = 1-2 hours; 4 = more than 2 hours
* 0 = Non; 1 = Low; 2 = Medium; 3 = High  
Talking with others 
about the issue 
Talking about  the issue  with other people; family, friends, 
colleagues at work, or with people in public places.  
The total of four questions’ answers were computed to calculate 
arithmetic mean of this variable.  
1 = Never; 2 = Few; 3 = Sometimes; 4 = Always
Political 
involvement in 
media
1- I paid attention to parliamentary election in mass media.
2- I paid attention to government's formation and activities.
3- I paid attention to decisions and activities of the Military 
Council in mass media.
4- When I see or read news about elections or candidates I try to 
know how much it is bias.
5- When I see or read political news I try to know what is going 
around it.
6- News about political candidates or people in government 
drive me to ask how they can change things.
0 = Never; 1 = Few; 2 = Sometimes; 3 = Always
To be continued
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Variables Items Scales
Internal political 
efficacy
1- Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that 
a person like me can't really understand what's going on. 
2- I think that I know less about politics and government than 
most other people.
Both internal and external political efficacy items 
were reversed and coded:  
1 = Agree strongly; 2 = Agree somewhat; 3 
= Neither agree nor disagree; 4 = Disagree 
somewhat; 5 =Disagree stronglyExternal political 
efficacy
1- The government (people in government) does/do not care a 
lot about what all of us think. 
2- Politicians are always in search of their personal interest. 
Political 
participation
1- Membership in parties. 
2- voting in elections and referendums.
3- protest activities.
4- membership in one of civil institutions.
5- membership in one of 25 January Revolution's coalitions. 
6- participation in political and social conferences.
7- communication with media to express own views.
8- participation in strikes. 
 0 = No; 1 = yes
External 
conspiracy notion 
against Egypt
1- There have been attempts by some external actors to create a 
rift between the people and the army.
2- There are elements trying to take advantage of the blood of 
the martyrs of the revolution and implement an international 
plan to destabilize the status quo in Egypt.
1 = Disagree strongly; 
2 = Disagree somewhat;
3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 
4 = Agree somewhat; 
5 = Agree strongly
Internal 
conspiracy notion 
against Egypt 
1- An attempt led by Internal parties to disrupt the parliamentary 
elections and drag the country into chaos.
2- Attempts by remnants and followers of the Mubarak regime 
and his family to avenge the Egyptian people. 
3- Hidden hands trying to destabilize the Egyptian national 
security and corrupt the purity of the country.
Tolerance for the 
Military Council
1- Army troops have the right to direct weapons against 
demonstrators to defend itself or state facilities.
2- The Military Council running the country in the same way of 
the regime of former President Mubarak.
3- Dragging a young woman along the ground and baring her 
torso in the Al-Tahrir Square is a personal mistake by Egyptian 
army soldiers and not to be charged by the Military Council.
4- The Military Council exhausted the balance of confidence 
with the Egyptian people as the executive to manage the affairs 
of the state.
5- The Military Council proceeded to create stability in Egypt 
through the management of the affairs of the country  (the 
country's affairs management). 
6- The nature of the events reveals the Military Council's losing 
his legitimacy On which its  leaders build their management of 
the transitional period.
7- The Military Council bears the burden of what is happening 
because he did not give a serious investigation In order to detect 
the perpetrators of the previous massacres. 
Items numbers 1,3,5 were coded: 
1 = Disagree strongly; 
2 = Disagree somewhat; 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 
4 = Agree somewhat; 
5 = Agree strongly
Items numbers 2,4,6,7 were reversed and coded: 
1 = Agree strongly; 
2 = Agree somewhat; 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 
4 = Disagree somewhat; 
5 = Disagree strongly 
Continued
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Variables Items Scales
Tolerance for the 
demonstrators
1- The actions of the rebels against the army and the police 
abused the 25 January Revolution.
2- Sit-ins and demonstrations are necessary to complete the 
revolution goals.
3- Rebels' behaviors gave the opportunity to the thugs in order 
to bring more violence. 
4- The young men rebels deserve to feel sympathize with them 
and fend any attacks on them. 
5- There are more opportunities for the bloodshed because of the 
folly of some of the protesters.
6- Burning and destructing facilities is sufficient justification for 
the use of violence against demonstrators.
Items numbers 2,4 were coded: 
1 = Disagree strongly; 
2 = Disagree somewhat; 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree; 
4 = Agree somewhat; 
5 = Agree strongly
Items numbers 1,3,5,6 were reversed and coded: 
1 = Agree strongly; 
2 = Agree somewhat;  
3= Neither agree nor disagree; 
4 = Disagree somewhat; 
5 = Disagree strongly
Feelings  towards 
The Military 
Council  
1- How much sympathetic do you feel toward The Military 
Council?.
2- How much enthusiastic do u feel toward The Military 
Council?.  
1 2 3 4  5  6  7  8  9
Not           Strongly
sympathetic         sympathetic 
         
        
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 8  9
Not          Strongly
enthusiastic     enthusiastic            
The higher number is for more sympathy or 
enthusiasm you feel. The lower number is for 
less feeling. You will give 5 rating if your feeling 
is neutral. 
Feelings 
thermometer 
towards the 
demonstrators 
1- How much sympathetic do you feel toward the 
demonstrators?.
2- How much enthusiastic do u feel toward the demonstrators?.
Gender (male) male
female
1 = male
0 =female
Age 
18-more than 50 years old 
1 = 18-25
2 = 26-39
3 = 40-50
4 = more than 50
Education 1 = High school or less
2 = University degree
3 = Advanced studies
4 = Master or PHD degree
Income Respondents were asked to mention the total income by 
Egyptian pound for the family per month 
1 = 700 or less
2 = 700-1,500
3 = 1,500-2,500 
4 = 2,500-4,000
5 = 4,000-6,000
6 = more than 6,000
Political affiliation 
(Islamist)  
Respondents were asked to choose one of the candidates or 
political parties which they voted for, or they may favor: 
liberals, Islamists, Leftists, independent or do not care.   
1 = Islamism
0 = other variables
Continued
